• Texas redistricting mid-decade set a precedent for control of state congressional redistricting by national party leaders and other outside interests. [2] (7) The most visible, responsible figure and essential element was Rep. Tom DeLay, who used "Texans for a Republican Majority Political Action Committee" (TRMPAC) to elect a clear majority in the Texas House and help his friend Tom Craddick become Speaker in 2003. (7-9)
• How did Tom Delay and TRMPAC take over the House? Money. TRMPAC’s most famous expenditure, subject of ongoing criminal investigations and prosecutions, was a Sept. 2002 transfer of $190,000 in corporate dollars to the Republican National Committee. The blank check was ordered by TRMPAC's Executive Director, working from the campaign headquarters of Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott. A messenger brought the check to the Executive Director at the Attorney General’s campaign headquarters. The check was made out to the Republican National State Elections Committee (RNSEC) who, in early October 2002, sent $190,000 to seven TRMPAC targeted Texas races. (69)
• The plan was hatched with the Texas Attorney General. On January 14, 2003 Tom DeLay met in Austin with Speaker Craddick, Governor Perry, Attorney General Abbott and Lieutenant Governor Dewhurst, and "left with an understanding that he had a commitment from the state leaders to proceed with congressional redistricting." (298).
• The Texas Attorney General issued the key opinion. In Feb. 2003, the Chairman of the Texas House Redistricting Committee asked the Texas Attorney General whether lawmakers had a responsibility to enact a permanent map for the electoral period 2003 through 2010. The Chairman was quoted in the press and by a fellow legislator as stating he had no intention of taking action on redistricting unless the Attorney General told him he had to do so. The Attorney General's April 23 2003 opinion "provided an impetus for the legislature to act," (128-29) and was distributed to lawmakers on April 24, to coincide with DeLay's arrival in Austin.
• The Texas Attorney General facilitated legislative redistricting.
  • In May 2003, House Democrats thwarted the Republican plan via walkout. The Texas Attorney General assured the Department of Public Safety it had authority to arrest the absent lawmakers, then asked for assistance from the United States Department of Justice, including repeated requests as to whether the FBI could assist. The U. S. Attorney stated that the office would not become involved. (142-145). The FBI in Ardmore, Oklahoma also refused the request of the Texas Attorney General to arrest the Texas legislators in Ardmore. (147)
  • On June 16, 2003, "the critical meeting" among the five "principals" occurred "to agree on a legislative strategy and calendar" (164). The five principals at the "crucial" meeting: Delay, Perry, Dewhurst, Speaker Craddick and Attorney General Abbott (164). The five affirmed the redistricting effort would continue and agreed on a strategy for passing a redistricting plan (300). Governor Perry called a special session for redistricting on June 18, 2003. (The Texas Attorney General was the advocate for claiming in federal court that changing senate rules for 2/3 approval was not an "election change" under the Voting Rights Act requiring Department of Justice pre-clearance. Ironically, the Texas Attorney General also requested the Department of Justice to preclear the action) (210). After Senate Democrats killed redistricting with one Republican Senator, Democratic senators boycotted, and a second special session convened without a senate quorum. The Attorney General's office announced it would advise Department of Public Safety to go after the absent senators. (206)
• The Texas Attorney General advised the legislature, assuring them its partisan plan would pass muster. A third special session resulted in partisan redistricting. Attorney General Abbott and others, including Ted Cruz, advised. The Texas Attorney General provided the critical legal advice that the plan could be defended before the Department of Justice and the Courts, emboldening map drawers to reduce minority presence and eliminate Democratic Congressmen. (246).
• The Texas Attorney General falsely claimed professional staff had not been overruled by political appointees. After submission of the plan to the Department of Justice, the Texas Attorney General denied that Voting Section professional staff had recommended against approval but had been overruled by political appointees, claiming "no truth or evidence to support aspersions such as that." (257). In truth, all eight career, professional staff recommended objection as violation of the Voting Rights Act, a unanimous recommendation against approval, in a 73 page memo which was not discovered until two years later. In truth, professional career staff had indeed been overruled by the Department's political appointees. (258-259).
• The Texas Attorney General was wrong in assuring the Texas Legislature that its partisan plan would pass the Supreme Court. On June 28, 2006 the U. S. Supreme Court upheld much but also determined that the plans' changes to District 23 violated the Voting Rights Act, ordering remedial plans submitted to the district court, which drew its own plan. The district judge rejected the arguments of Texas Solicitor General Cruz, reminding him that the 2003 voting rights violation occurred due to the legislature's "aggressive" effort to save the incumbent republican, and the remedy would leave him at risk of defeat (which occurred).

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[1] Texas lost nearly a century of seniority years and three significant committee chairmanships due to mid decade redistricting. (Austin American-Statesman June 28, 2007)
[2] All references are to Univ. of Texas Prof Steve Bickerstaff’s well researched "Lines in the Sand," the definitive history of the 2003 partisan fight over Texas’ 32 congressional seats.